Effect of memory on the prisoner's dilemma game in a square lattice by Qin, Shao-Meng et al.
ar
X
iv
:0
80
1.
28
27
v2
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  3
0 O
ct 
20
08
Phys. Rev. E 78, 041129 (2008).
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We have studied the effect of memory on evolution of the prisoner’s dilemma game using square
lattice networks. Based on extensive simulations, we found that the density of cooperators was
enhanced by an increasing memory effect for most parameters. However, we also observed that the
density of cooperators decreased with an increased memory effect in the case of a large memory
and moderate temptation. It is interesting to note that memory makes cooperators immune from
temptation. The strength of protection reaches its maximal value only for the moderate memory
effect.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 05.50.+q, 64.60.Ht, 87.23.Ge
I. INTRODUCTION
The evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG)
has attracted substantial attention over the past few
decades [1]. In this game, two agents must simultane-
ously select one of two strategies: cooperation or defec-
tion. The prisoners receive payoffs that are dependent
on their choices. A selfish agent will adapt their strategy
to maximize their payoff. Game theory involves the con-
struction of many types of models and analysis of these
models using varied parameters. Therefore, game theory
serves as a powerful metaphore for simulation of the inter-
actions between individuals in many domains, including
biology, economy, and ecology.
In the PDG, mutual cooperation generates the highest
return for the community. However, the Nash equilib-
rium state is mutual defection because defection is a bet-
ter choice for the prisoner, regardless of the strategy of
the other prisoner. Importantly, in the real world, mutual
cooperation is the most commonly utilized strategy. Sys-
tems such as the PDG are considered to be an important
tool for study the emergence of cooperative behavior be-
tween selfish individuals [2, 3, 4]. Nowak and May [5] in-
troduced a spatial prisoner’s dilemma game (SPDG) con-
sisting of a two-state cellular automaton. In the general
SPDG, the agents in the game play the PDG with their
network neighbors and get payoffs according to a payoff
matrix. The total payoff of each agent is the sum of all
payoffs in this step. An agent may then mimic his neigh-
bor’s strategy by comparing his payoffs in this step with
his neighbor’s payoffs. An important conclusion is that
spatial structure can promote the persistence of coopera-
tion. Because the interactions of an agent are limited to
his local neighbors, PDG models have been extensively
explored in the past few years [1, 6, 7, 8]. In addition to
spatial structure, there are several mechanisms that may
facilitate the emergence and persistence of cooperation
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among populations. Hamilton found that kin selection
can favor cooperation [9]. Axelrod’s model demonstrated
that the tit for tat strategy could sustain cooperation in
systems of all players playing the game together. The
simulation performed by Szabo´, Vukov, and Szolnoki pro-
vided evidence that noise and irrational choices affect the
maintenance of cooperative behavior [10].
In the traditional SPDG model, the changing prob-
ability of strategy is determined by the agents’ perfor-
mance on one step. In other words, people assume that
the agents are shortsighted and forgetful. In fact, when
people make an important decision, they generally con-
sider the current situation and their experiences. There-
fore, the effect of memory should be taken into account.
Historical memory plays a key role in the evolutionary
game [11]. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate
whether memory enhances the density of cooperators and
detracts the cooperators from the temptation. We ob-
served the maximum value of critical points from a ho-
mogeneous cooperator to a mixed state of cooperator and
defector.
In this paper, we consider an evolutionary SPDG with
the memory effect in a square lattice, in which players
update their strategy by considering previous payoffs.
The rules of the game are explained in section II. The
simulations, which are detailed in section III, show that
the evolution of SPDG depends on the magnitude of the
memory effect and payoff-matrix elements. Conclusions
are drawn in the last section.
II. MODEL
In the traditional PDG, there are two players. Each
player choses one of two strategies: cooperator (C) or
defector (D). There are four combinations for the two
players: (C, C), (C, D), (D, C), and (D, D), which
corresponded to payoffs (R, R), (S, T ), (T , S), and (P ,
P ). The rewards or punishments for each player can be
tabulated as 2× 2 payoff matrices (see Table I).
Four elements in the payoff matrix satisfy the order
2TABLE I: The payoff matrix of prisoner’s dilemma game.
player1\player2 C D
C R \ R S \ T
D T \ S P \ P
ranking T > R > P > S and the additional constraint
T + S < 2R for repeated interactions. As suggested by
Nowak and May [5], the parameters in this paper are
R = 1, T = b, S = 0, and P = 0. Our model preserve the
essentials of PDG and b is the only tunable parameter.
Our study is based on systematic Monte Carlo (MC)
simulations on a square lattice network with periodic
boundary conditions. When we applied the PDG on the
network, the players were located on the nodes. In ev-
ery MC step, the players simultaneously play the PDG
with their network neighbors (only the first neighbor-
hoods) and themselves. The sum payoff of each player is
the sum over all games. The evolutionary process is gov-
erned by strategy imitation. In every MC step, all agents
may mimic their neighbors strategy. Player i adopts a
(randomly chosen) neighbor’s strategy (at site j) with a
probability that depends upon the payoff difference:
W =
1
1 + exp [(Em(i)− Em(j))/κ]
, (1)
where κ indicates the noise generated by the players
allowing irrational choices [12, 13]. In this work, we use
κ = 0.1 for all simulations. Em(i) and Em(j) are the
total payoffs which contain the sum payoffs at this MC
step U and the cumulative historical payoff. For each
node i, there are two memories Mc(i, t) and Md(i, t) at
step t. When node i is associated with the strategy C
and the sum payoff at this MC step is U ,
Em(i) = U +Mc(i, t)
Mc(i, t+ 1) = (Mc(i, t) + U) ∗ τ
Md(t+ 1) = Md(t) ∗ τ, (2)
for this time step. When the node i is associated with
strategy D
Em(i) = U +Md(i, t)
Mc(i, t+ 1) = Mc(i, t) ∗ τ
Md(i, t+ 1) = (U +Md(i, t)) ∗ τ. (3)
Here, τ is the memory factor and 0 ≤ τ < 1. Mc(i, t)
and Md(i, t) represent the historical payoffs of C and D,
respectively. The memory effect for each MC step de-
clines with time. In other words, memories of the payoffs,
Mc(i, t) and Md(i, t), will be forgotten as time passes.
τ = 0 indicates that there is no memory effect. As τ
nears to 1, there exists an almost perfect memory effect
in the model. Starting from a random initial state with
an equal fraction ofC andD andMc(i, 0) =Md(i, 0) = 0,
we iterate the model with a synchronized update.
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Density of cooperators fc as a function
of the payoff parameter b with various memory factors τ .
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
Our simulations are carried out by varying b and τ .
The results described in this paper are obtained from
MC simulations with a system size of 200×200, with the
exception of the results shown in Fig. 4. It is true that a
network with larger size will decrease the ensemble error,
which is caused by the finite scale of networks. We have
simulated our model with 100×100 and 400×400. There
is not conspicuous difference among these networks. The
results in this manuscript are the average of 20 trials
with various random seeds. Repeating simulations with
different random seeds can also reduce the error. There-
fore, the 200× 200 is large enough. The transient time is
varied from 20, 000 to 80, 000 MC steps. After the tran-
sient state, the system reached the stable state, and the
amplitudes of population fluctuations were considerably
smaller than the corresponding average value.
To characterize the macroscopic behavior of the sys-
tem, we measure the density of C fc first. Fig. 1 shows
the fc on the square lattice as a function of b for sev-
eral values of τ . We find that there are two thresholds
of temptation b. When b < bc1, the networks in which
only C can survive are in the stable state. The den-
sity of C decreases monotonously with increasing values
of b for b > bc1. We upload the movies which presents
how the systems with network size of 240 × 240 evolve
in 300 MC steps after transient time on different b and
τ [14]. In these movies Cs are presented by black boxes
and Ds are presented by red boxes. It is observed that
the agents who utilize the same strategies join together
to form complex patterns that continuously move and
change shape. These patterns develop because agents
change their strategies by learning from their neighbors.
Furthermore, the Cs who join together are more stable
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FIG. 2: (Color online) bc1 as a function of memory factor τ
on the square lattice. The data points depicted by squares
(black) are the result of MC simulations, and the data points
depicted by triangles (red) were derived from Eq. (6).
because they support each other by earning payoff from
their C neighbors. For b > bc2, C strategies die out. Both
the memory factors τ and κ affect the critical point [10].
Recently in Ref. [15] Szabo´, Vukov and Szolnoki draw
a κ − b plane of Newman-Watts networks. In contrast
to τ , κ does not conspicuously affect bc1 or bc2 in this
model. The main focus of this paper is to evaluate how
the memory effect τ affects the density of C and bc1. De-
termination of κ − bc1 and κ − bc2 is beyond the scope
of this paper. bc2 increases with τ monotonously; how-
ever, bc1 reaches its maximum value near τ = 0.72, and
bc1 tends toward 4/3 as τ approaches 0 or 1 (see black
squares in Fig. 2). Fig. 1, we find the memory effect en-
hances the density of C in most cases; however, the den-
sity of C decreases with increasing of τ only for τ > 0.72
and 1.75 < b < 1.8. It should be noted that our simu-
lations are consistent with those presented in Fig. 1 of
Ref. [12] for τ = 0 despite the fact that Szabo´ and To¨ke
used the asynchronized update law in their model. The
mean-field results for six-point approximations [16] agree
with the simulation in [12] and our model in the case of
τ = 0. We assume that the six-point approximation in-
cludes the main features of the two models. Importantly,
the six-point approximation does not contain a restric-
tion of the update law. Therefore, it is conjectured that
the synchronized update does not play an important role
in the two models.
In comparision to the case of τ = 0, we know that
enhancement of the density of C is caused by Mc and
Md. From the above-mentioned definitions, the Mc and
Md of one node are determined by two factors: (1) the
payoff income U of every MC step and (2) whether the
node maintains one strategy. Mc or Md is aggravated
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The average payoffs for strategies C
and D as a function of the payoff parameter b for several
values of the memory factor τ .
if the node persists in C or D respectively. Fig. 3 plots
the average Mc and Md of all nodes as a function of b.
It should be noted that Mc is always larger than Md.
Therefore memory effect almost always enhances fc in
this model. For b < bc1, the networks include only C.
Every node can receive payoffs 5 at every MC step and
Mc is 5∗τ/(1−τ). Then, with an increase of b, the emer-
gence of D reduces the value of C’s payoff for every MC
step and decreases the continuous accumulation of Mc.
As a result, Mc gradually decreases with b until C dies
out andMc = 0. In contrast toMc,Md has a peak in the
C-D coexistent states. When D is outside of the mixed
region,Md is equal to 0. D earns a payoff only by playing
the game with C. Therefore, Md is not equal to 0 in the
C-D coexistent region bc1 < b < bc2. When b is little bit
larger than bc1 and 1 − fc ≪ 1, D forms small isolated
gangs. As discussed in [12], the behaviors of D gangs are
considered as branching and annihilating random walk-
ers [17, 18]. The D gangs undergo four basic processes:
random walk; an annihilation reaction (two D gangs can
unite); death (one gang of D will die due to the irra-
tional choice); and branching (one gang of D can divided
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FIG. 4: The critical exponent β as a function of τ of bc1. The
error bar in the figure presents the standard deviation. In
order to suppress the statistical error in the critical regions,
we use the system size 600 × 600 for τ ≤ 0.6, 800 × 800 for
0.75 ≥ τ > 0.6 and 1000× 1000 for τ > 0.75.
into two gangs). Every D gang that obtains the highest
payoff at every MC step is surrounded by cooperators.
However, the density of D is low, and random walking
breaks the continual accumulation ofMd. Therefore,Md
is small. When D is dominant, the random walking of
C gangs does not deplete the accumulating of Md but
the average payoff of D decreases at each MC step. Thus
Md is maximized when there is a compromise between
the average payoff at each MC step and continual accu-
mulation of Md.
In [12, 15], the authors discussed the critical expo-
nent of bc1 and bc2. Their MC simulations indicated
a power-law behavior, namely fc ∝ (bc2 − b)
β and
1 − fc ∝ (b − bc1)
β , and the values of β agreed with the
directed percolation (DP) exponent. Grassberger and
Janssen conjectured that all one-component models with
a single absorbing state belong to the universality class
of (DP) [19]. The value of critical exponents should be
independent of the details of dynamical rules and depen-
dent on the spatial dimension. In this paper, we investi-
gated these exponents in the context of different values of
τ . Fig. 4 shows that β, which ranged from 0.47 (τ = 0)
to 1.10825 (τ = 0.9) is monotonously increase with τ .
Therefore, the value of the critical exponent is not uni-
versal but depends on the memory factor τ in this model.
Considering that a persistent unchanged strategy at
one site leads to the accumulation history payoff, we in-
vestigated the mobility of spatial patterns of τ . Pop-
ulation mobility is a central feature of real ecosystems:
animals migrate, bacteria run and tumble. Similar phe-
nomena can be observed in a rock-paper-scissors game
[20]. Reichenbach, Mobilia, and Frey, observed that mo-
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FIG. 5: (color online) (a) Time autocorrelation function of
strategy for several values of τ . (b) The characteristic time
ρ(τ ) as a function of τ . The red line is the fitting result of
this figure ρ = 4.29 ∗ (1− τ )−2.22
bility critical influence on species diversity. In this model,
we find that the behavior of bc1 is caused by the decrease
in strategy mobility. This means that C resists tempta-
tion b by decreasing mobility. Therefore, we introduce
the time autocorrelation function of strategy:
g(τ, b, t) = 〈si(0)si(t)〉 , (4)
where si(t) is the strategy of player i at MC step t.
When player i chose C, si(t) = 1. In contrast, si(t) =
−1 for D. 〈〉 denotes an average over all nodes in the
networks. Considering that g(τ, b, t) can be affected by
density of C and in order to ensure that g(τ, b, t) ranges
from 0 to 1, we chose b such that fc = 0.5. This definition
describes whether the node’s recent strategy correlates
with its strategy at later t MC steps.
Fig. 5(a) displays the attenuation of g(τ, t)fc=0.5 with
time. It was found that g(τ, t)fc=0.5 fits with the form
g(τ, t)fc=0.5 = exp(−t/ρ(τ)). One can regard ρ as the
characteristic residence time of the unaltered strategy.
We define th as the number of MC steps for which one
5FIG. 6: Illustration of the D-D pair (nodes A and B) and
neighbor C (node C). The black circle and white circle denote
D and C, respectively. D-D pair indicates that both nodes
are connected in the networks by strategy D.
strategy was maintained and assume that the character-
istic residence time ρ and th have a similar ratio:
th = ρ/A+B, (5)
Fig. 5(b) shows ρ as a function of the parameter τ .
There is a critical behavior at ρ ∝ (1 − τ)−z , where the
exponent is z = 2.22 with standard deviation 0.043.
Now we focus our attention on the behavior of bc1.
When b > bc1, C cannot resist temptation b and D ap-
pears. Therefore, bc1 can be regarded as the ability of the
model to protect C. As described in the discussion above,
the D gangs undergo four basic processes. When b = bc1
and 1 − fc ≪ 1, the annihilation process is rare, while
the death and branching processes are major activities.
Therefore, D gangs become stable if the branching rate
is greater than the death rate. We found that the sin-
gle D in the branching process will have an offspring and
form D-D pairs (as shown in Fig. 6). The D-D pair plays
an important role in the branching process of D gangs.
When we discard the effect of noise, the total payoff Em
of each player in D-D pairs (nodes A and B in Fig. 6)
must be larger than the payoff of his neighbor C (node
C in Fig. 6). Otherwise, the D gangs will eventually die.
For example, in the case of τ = 0, the total payoff of
each player in D-D pairs is 3b, and the total payoff of his
neighbor C is 4. Therefore, the threshold for a stable D
is bc1 = 4/(3b) = 4/3. We suggest that the deviation of
4/3 , which was obtained our simulations was caused by
noise.
The behavior of a stable D is subtle for τ > 0. Based
on the discussion above, the increase of th with τ and th
determines the player’s memory and total payoffs. There-
fore, we can use th to approximate bc1. When the th of
the D-D pair is N and we neglect the remnants Md,
which accumulated many MC steps ago and assume that
neighbor C can remain as C indefinitely because of the
dominance of C at b = bc1, we find that
bc1 =
4
3(1− tN+1h )
. (6)
In Fig. 2, we plot the results from Eq. (6) which are
similar to the simulation results. We use A = 27 and
B = 0.63 in Eq. (5).
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the ability of memory to pro-
tect C from D in an evolutionary PDG in a square lat-
tice networks. With an increase in the effect of memory,
there is an increase in the density of C in most cases.
In compution of the autocorrelation function, we used
the characteristic residence time to measure the mobil-
ity of a spatial pattern. We also found that the mobility
of a spacial pattern decreases with the memory effect.
Decreasing mobility induces a maximum value of criti-
cal coexistence point bc1 at τ = 0.72. It is obvious that
mobility plays an important role in this model. The ef-
fect of memory on cooperative behaviors may draw some
attention in evolutionary games.
We have also applied this model to the Newman-Watts
small-world (NWSW) networks [21]. The NWSW net-
work is a two dimension small-world network. We found
that moderate long range links did not have an obvious
qualitative influence on our model.
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